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We find that inflation did not unanimously decrease savings in the US during the postwar 
period. This result is puzzling as it contradicts the implications of most monetary general 
equilibrium models. 
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The theoretical evidence on the e®ects of in°ation on savings is mixed. In his pioneering
work, Sidrauski (1967) studies a general equilibrium framework and ¯nds that money is
superneutral in the steady state.1 Accordingly, in°ation does not a®ect the savings rate
in the long-run.2 Stockman (1981) shows that the same result also obtains in models with
a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption. However, if the cash-in-advance constraint
also applies to investment, a higher money growth rate reduces the savings rate. Den Haan
(1990) considers a shopping-time model where in°ation distorts the allocation of time on
shopping, leisure, and labor. For higher in°ation the opportunity costs of money increase,
and agents reallocate more time to shopping activities. As a consequence, savings decrease.
The e®ect of in°ation is also quantitatively very pronounced in many general equilibrium
models. For example, in the benchmark calibration of the model by den Haan (1990) a rise
of the in°ation rate from 0% to 5% decreases savings by almost 10% (own calculations). A
similar negative quantitative e®ect of in°ation on savings can be found in the model by Heer
and SÄ ussmuth (2006) who model the \Feldstein Channel". As argued by Feldstein (1982),
loose monetary policy can increase the real capital income tax burden in a nominally based
tax system. Therefore, higher in°ation reduces the return on savings. In sum, the majority
of computable general equilibrium studies either ¯nds no or a signi¯cantly negative e®ect
of in°ation on long-run savings.
In the models of Stockman (1981), den Haan (1990), or Heer and SÄ ussmuth (2006), growth
is exogenous and in°ation only a®ects the savings rate. Equivalently, in models of endoge-
nous growth, higher in°ation decreases the growth rate via the very same mechanisms. In
these models, a lower labor supply is associated with less growth. In general, however, the
quantitative growth rate e®ects in these models are found to be rather modest (see Jones
and Manuelli, 1995). Most recent empirical studies are concerned rather with the e®ects
of in°ation on the growth rate than with those on the savings rate. In this vein, Kormendi
and Meguire (1985), Fisher (1991), or Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995), among others,
have identi¯ed the in°ation rate as an important (and signi¯cantly negative) determinant
1In previous work on the e®ect of in°ation on the portfolio allocation, Tobin (1965) assumed a constant
savings rate.
2If labor supply is elastic, in°ation may increase or decrease the savings rate depending on the functional
form of utility.
1of economic growth. However, the long-term correlation of savings and in°ation has not
received any attention hitherto.
2 The empirical relationship of savings and in°ation
In order to study the e®ects of in°ation on savings, we perform a regression analysis using
the available annual US data from the period 1965-1998 that allows us to distinguish the
monetary policy regimes of the Pre-Volcker Era prior (Pre-VE, 1965-78), the Volcker Era
(VE, 1979-87), and the ¯rst eleven years of the Greenspan Era (GE, 1988-98). We also
include the e®ective capital income tax rate as an additional regressor given the importance
of the \Feldstein channel" emphasized in the literature.3 As we are aiming to investigate
the long-term relationship between the accumulation of capital and in°ation, we extract
trend components from the respective series.4 We use an HP ¯lter with a weight of 6:25 as
recently suggested for series of annual frequency by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).5 In particular,
we estimate the following equation
s
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t , and ¿TC
t denote the trend components of the savings rate, the in°ation
rate, and the capital income tax rate, respectively. Estimating this equation over the
total observation period from 1965 to 1998 renders no statistically signi¯cant relationship.
However, the discrimination in Fed presidency regimes produces more reasonable results
summarized in Table 1 below.
3We compute e®ective capital tax rates by following the strategy described in Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994). Accordingly, we rely on data obtained from the OECD Statistical Compedium annual series
(Revenue Statistics, National Accounts I, and Economic Outlook). See Mendoza et al. (1994), p. 300-306,
for further details.
4Our ¯ndings are almost the same if we apply stochastic-trend rather than deterministic trend methods.
The results are summarized in an appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
5The application of an HP ¯lter with a standard weight of 100 for annual series (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997) produces fairly similar estimates. We also tried some bandpass ¯lters. However, as it is more
parsimonious, with regard to degrees of freedom, the HP ¯lter seems better suited in the presence of the
short series at stake.
2Table 1. Relationship between saving rates and in°ation by Fed presidency regime
Pre-VE 1965-78 VE 1979-87 GE 1988-98
¼TC
t ¡0:246¤¤¤ 0:635¤¤¤ ¡0:552¤¤
¿TC
t ¡0:018 ¡0:391¤ ¡1:029¤¤¤
adjusted R-squ. 0:939 0:966 0:788
Note: All trend components are normalized, all estimates include a constant.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at 10, 5, 1% level of signi¯cance
(Newey-West, 1987, std. errors).
Data: IFS Series (IMF), Mendoza et al. (1994), OECD, and own calculations
Higher capital income taxation seems to reduce savings, a result in accordance with the
\Feldstein Channel". The e®ect of in°ation on savings, however, is not robust: Depending
on the sample period, the e®ect of in°ation on savings is ambiguous. Increasing in°ation
is associated with decreasing savings during the Greenspan and Pre-Volcker Era, yet it is
associated with increasing savings during the Volcker Era.
3 Conclusion
Computable general equilibrium models and empirical studies, in general, ¯nd an either
insigni¯cant or a signi¯cantly negative e®ect of in°ation on the growth rate. Likewise,
most computable general equilibrium models also imply a considerable negative e®ect of
in°ation on savings. We do not ¯nd unanimous support for the latter e®ect in the data.
For the total sample period 1965-98 and for the Volcker period 1979-87, in°ation either
does not a®ect savings signi¯cantly or even increases savings.
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44 Appendix
One may wonder what happens if the trend underlying the series is stochastic rather than
deterministic. Since UR tests are known to be of weak power, a sensitivity analysis of
results for the stochastic trend case is straightforward. Assuming a stochastic trend, we
estimate two standard error correction models (ECMs) of the form
model I : ¢lnst = ¯0 + ¯1¢ln¼t + ¯2 (lnst ¡ °¼ ln¼t¡1) + "t
model II : ¢lnst = ¯0 + ¯1¢ln¼t + ¯2¢ln¿t +
4 X
i=3
¯i (lnst ¡ °z lnzt¡1) + "t;
where zt = f¼t;¿tg and °-values are obtained from long term multipliers (Engle-Granger
two-step estimator). The results are summarized in Table 2. The overall picture is very
similar to the deterministic trend model. For the total 1965-1998 period, there is no
statistically signi¯cant cointegrating equation for both speci¯cations (model I and II). For
the Pre-VE we ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant cointegrating relationship between st and
¼t (for model II also for st and ¿t). For the Volcker Era the cointegrating equation is
only estimated signi¯cantly as long as capital tax rates are included in the ECM. For the
Greenspan Era the result is mixed, i.e. in speci¯cation I (II) the cointegrating relationship
is (not) statistically signi¯cant.
Table 2. US saving rates and in°ation by Fed regime: ECM
Pre-VE 1965-78 VE 1979-87 GE 1988-98
¢ln¼t +0:013¤ ¡0:003 +0:018 +0:041¤ +0:013 +0:014
lnst ¡ °¼ ln¼t¡1 ¡0:424¤ +8:814¤¤¤ ¡0:190 +22:86¤ ¡0:244¤¤ +1:453
¢ln¿t +0:015 +0:036 +0:003
lnst ¡ °¿ ln¿t¡1 +8:140¤¤¤ +24:34¤ ¡1:756
adjusted R-squ. 0:183 0:637 ¡0:032 0:426 0:103 ¡0:175
no. of obs. 14 14 9 9 11 11
Note: *, **, *** = signi¯cance at 10, 5, 1% level of signi¯cance (Newey-West, 1987, HAC std. errors).
Data: IFS Series (IMF), Mendoza et al. (1994), OECD, and own calculations.
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